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CIVIL RICO-FIRST AMENDMENT-THIRD CIRCUIT APPLIES
RACKETEERING STATUTE TO CIVIL PROTESTORS-ANTI-ABORTION
PROTESTORS FOUND LIABLE
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) provisions,' Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.2 With its enhanced sanctions and remedies, RICO
was designed to address the burgeoning problem of organized crime in
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1988)).
(705)
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the United States.3 Although RICO is comprised of both criminal4 and
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1988) (Congressional Statement of Findings and
Purpose); see REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SEC-
TION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BusINEss LAW 1, 70-126 (1985) [hereinafter
ABA REPORT] (detailed exposition of legislative history); Blakey & Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980) (same).
Section 1962 of the RICO statute delineates the prohibited activities as
follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partici-
pated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
Pertinent definitions under the statute include:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, deal-
ing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United State Code: . . . section 1951
[known as the Hobbs Act] (relating to interference with commerce, rob-
bery, or extortion) ....
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity[.]
Id. § 1961(1), (4) & (5).
4. See id. § 1963. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or
for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the
maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both[], and shall for-
feit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law -
706
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civil 5 components, the statute's civil provisions were rarely used in the
years following their enactment.6 Prior to 1980, only nine decisions
were reported involving actions under civil RICO. 7
The 1980s, however, have seen "an explosive growth of civil RICO
lawsuits." 8 The attraction of treble damages and attorney's fees has
transformed civil RICO into " 'the darling of the prosecutor's nurs-
ery.' " Additionally, civil RICO's appeal is derived from the potential
for stigmatization of the defendant as a racketeer, a circumstance that
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation
of section 1962;
(2) any-
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a
source of influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962 ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
5. See id. § 1964. The statute provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issu-
ing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any per-
son to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enter-
prise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign com-
merce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this sec-
tion. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time
enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other ac-
tions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it
shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any ap-
propriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United
States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under
this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential alle-
gations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the United States.
Id. § 1964(a)-(d).
6. ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 55. There was "one reported decision ad-
dressing Civil RICO as early as 1972, but only one other case before 1975 ... 
Id.
7. Id.
8. P. DICKINSON, CIVIL Rico: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
BUSINESS CRIMES 3 (1989); see ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-2, 55.
9. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1011 (quoting Judge Learned Hand's
3
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provides substantial incentive for settlement.' 0 During the early 1980s,
the great majority of civil RICO actions involved a commercial or busi-
ness setting, with mail, wire or securities fraud as the predicate, I I or
underlying, offense. 12 Recently, however, in Northeast Women's Center,
Inc. v. McMonagle,13 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit extended the reach of civil RICO beyond such usual areas. 14
In McMonagle, the Third Circuit held anti-abortion activists liable
under RICO for their intimidation and harassment of the clients and
employees of a women's health center, which included destruction of
the center's property.15 The Third Circuit's application of civil RICO to
a group of social protestors greatly expanded the reach of the statute 16
comment regarding crime of conspiracy in Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d
259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925)).
10. Note, The Enterprise Requirement: Getting to the Heart of Civil RICO, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 663, 668 & nn.30-31 (discussion of attraction of civil RICO
provisions).
11. For a discussion of what constitutes a predicate offense under RICO,
see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
12. ABA REPORT, supra note 3, at 57. The report of the survey noted:
[The ABA Task Force analyzed] approximately 300 federal civil RICO
cases since the statute's inception.
Forty percent of the cases involve allegations of securities fraud and
another 37 percent allege common law fraud in a commercial or busi-
ness setting. The remaining cases involve ... antitrust or unfair com-
petition (4 percent), bribery or commercial bribery (4 percent), fraud
not related to securities or business transactions (3 percent), labor-re-
lated matters (2 percent), theft or conversion (1 percent) .... [N]ine
percent ... involve allegations of... (arson, bribery, commercial brib-
ery, embezzlement, extortion, gambling, theft, [and] political
corruption).
Id. at 55-56 (footnote omitted).
13. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 88-1333, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
261 (1989).
14. See id. (application of civil RICO to social protestors). For a discussion
of McMonagle, see infra notes 71-137 and accompanying text.
15. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1357. For a detailed discussion of this holding,
see infra notes 112-37 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit also held that
the justification defense was not available to the anti-abortion activists.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350-52. For a discussion of the specific reasoning of
the court, see infra note 137.
Additionally, the McMonagle court held that the unclean hands doctrine
should not have been applied to preclude injunctive relief to the Northeast Wo-
men's Center. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1353-55. For the McMonagle court's anal-
ysis of why the unclean hands doctrine was inapplicable, see infra note 137.
Finally, the McMonagle court held that it was within the appropriate discre-
tion of the district court to determine that the issue of punitive damages should
not have been submitted to the jury. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1356-57. For a
discussion of the reasoning behind this holding, see infra note 137.
16. The Third Circuit's conclusion that civil RICO was applicable to the
abortion protestors in the instant case implicitly rejected the Second and Eighth
Circuit's requirement that the RICO enterprise or racketeering activity include a
pecuniary motive. See United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
708 [Vol. 35: p. 705
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and raised important issues regarding the application of civil RICO and
first amendment' 7 freedoms. The potential impact of the application of
civil RICO on the first amendment right of association is the focus of
this Casebrief. 18
II. BACKGROUND
A. Civil RICO
RICO was designed as a federal law enforcement weapon to attack
nied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981).
In Ivic, the Second Circuit held that financial motivation was a prerequisite
for a civil RICO action. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 59-60. The Ivic court decided that four
Croatian Nationalists committed to the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia
could not be held liable under civil RICO for their conspiratorial activities be-
cause they were politically, not financially, motivated. Id. at 59-64.
In Anderson, the Eighth Circuit addressed the statutory interpretation of the
word "enterprise" as used in the RICO statute. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1362-72.
After examining the language of the statute and its legislative history, the Ander-
son court concluded that a RICO enterprise must be "directed toward an eco-
nomic goal." Id. at 1372.
After the district court had decided McMonagle, but prior to the Third Cir-
cuit's review, the Eighth Circuit again held that "[a RICO] enterprise must be
directed toward an economic goal." Flynn, 852 F.2d at 1052 (citing United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981)).
The Third Circuit's elimination of the pecuniary requirement greatly ex-
tends the reach of civil RICO. Yet, the Third Circuit's opinion lacked any dis-
cussion regarding this issue. See McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342. The court neither
offered its reasons for disregarding the available precedent, nor acknowledged
that it was creating a split among the circuits. See id.; Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 21-22,
McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Center Inc., 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989) (No. 88-
2137) [hereinafter Petition]. Interestingly, G. Robert Blakey, who was instru-
mental in the creation of the RICO statute, was a Counsel of Record for the
defendants in their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
elimination of the requirement of economic motivation was contrary to "Con-
gress' plainly stated intent." Petition, supra, at 10.
In his dissenting opinion from a denial of certiorari, Justice White acknowl-
edged that the Third Circuit's opinion in McMonagle created a split among the
circuits regarding the RICO pecuniary motive requirement. McMonagle v.
Northeast Women's Center, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 261, 261 (1989) (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice White "would [have] grant[ed] certiorari to resolve the conflict."
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." Id.
18. For a discussion of the potential impact of McMonagle on first amend-
ment freedoms, see infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
1990] 709
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the problem of organized crime. ' 9 Its purpose was to prevent organized
crime from investing in, acquiring, maintaining or operating legitimate
businesses with criminal money or through criminal activity. 20 Section
1962 of the RICO provisions delineates four separate causes of action
designed to achieve these goals. 2 1 For each of the defined causes of
action, the plaintiff must establish the existence of an "enterprise" and a
"pattern of racketeering activity."' 22
Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."' 23
"Racketeering activity" is defined, in part, as any act "chargeable"
under certain state laws, any act "indictable" under specific federal crim-
inal provisions, any "offense" involving fraud in bankruptcy or the sale
of securities and drug-related activities "punishable" under federal
law.2 4 Section 1961's definition of racketeering activity lists the particu-
lar crimes which can be a part of a pattern of racketeering activity. 25
These enumerated crimes are often called "predicate offenses .. .be-
cause they constitute the predicate for a RICO violation."'2 6 Under sec-
tion 1961(5), a " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of [RICO] and the last of which occurred within ten years (exclud-
ing any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity."127
RICO imposes criminal penalties for violation of section 1962 and
also has a civil enforcement scheme which includes a provision for pri-
vate suits. 28 Any individual may bring a civil RICO action if he alleges
that he was " 'injured in his business or property by reason of' the de-
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1988) (Congressional Statement of Findings
and Purpose).
20. See id. § 1962. For the statutory language of section 1962, see supra
note 3.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
22. See id. For the text of the pertinent definitions under the statute, see
supra note 3.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
24. Id. § 1961(1); see also Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-
83 (1985) (discussion of "pattern of racketeering activity"). For a discussion of
Sedima, see infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
26. D. SMITH & T. REED, CIVIL Rico 2.01, at 2-2 (1989).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). For a discussion of the pattern require-
ment, see Note, The Pattern Requirement in Civil Rico is Working: Case Law after
Sedima, 33 VILL. L. REV. 205 (1988). The Supreme Court recently addressed
the pattern requirement of RICO. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899-900 (1989) (criminal conduct requires relationship plus
threat of continuity to establish pattern).
28. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988). For the statutory language of these
sections, see supra notes 4-5.
710 [Vol. 35: p. 705
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fendant's 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ",29
Limitations on the use of RICO's private civil action was the subject
of Sedima S. P.R. L. v. Imrex Co. 30 In Sedima, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the proliferation of civil RICO litigation. 3' It also recognized
that civil "RICO is evolving into something different from the original
conception of its enactors. '" 32 Nevertheless, the Court stated that
although civil RICO is being used against "legitimate" businesses rather
than against the "archetypal, intimidating mobster," it was not the role
of the judiciary to correct this issue.3 3 Rather, Congress must correct
"this defect-if defect it is-[because it] is inherent in the statute." '34
29. Lacaovara & Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People:
The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEw. ENG. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985-86)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982)).
30. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The increasing popularity of civil RICO actions
resulted in various attempts by the courts to narrow its reach. See Note, supra
note 10, at 668-73. Examples of limitations imposed by courts are the require-
ment that a plaintiff allege a nexus between the defendant and organized crime;
the requirement that there be a "prior conviction" for the predicate RICO acts;
and the requirement that there be a distinct "racketeering injury." Id. at 668-70.
Under the "prior conviction" limitation, "the defendant must have been con-
victed of the predicate offenses in a prior criminal action." Id. at 669. For a
discussion of the reasoning of the courts that adopted these limitations, see
Abrams, The Place of Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be Sued: Les-
sons in Statutory Interpretation from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1477,
1513-20 (1985).
Sedima involved a business fraud action brought under civil RICO in which
the Supreme Court held that RICO required neither a prior criminal conviction
for the predicate acts nor a distinct racketeering injury. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493-
97. Although the specific issue of the requirement of a nexus between the de-
fendant and organized crime was not before the Court, the Court, in dicta, also
rejected this argument. Id. at 496-99. The Court noted:
Instead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals, [civil
RICO] has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against
"respected and legitimate 'enterprises.' " Yet Congress wanted to
reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. The former en-
joy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity
from its consequences....
It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being
brought almost solely against [respected businesses], rather than
against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect-if defect
it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie
with Congress.
Id. at 499 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the impact of Sedima, see Note,
supra note 10, at 669-73.
Since Sedima, the debate regarding the reach of civil RICO has intensified.
For a discussion of both sides of this debate, see generally Note, Congress Re-
sponds to Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 851
(1986).
31. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485-86.
32. Id. at 500.
33. Id. at 499.
34. Id.
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Thus, in 1985, the Sedima Court gave the RICO statute a broad reading
which has greatly expanded its application.
B. The First Amendment
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly guaran-
tee a right of association, the Supreme Court has recognized such a
right.3 5 In 1958, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,3 6 the Court recog-
nized "that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech."3 7 In Patterson, the Alabama Attorney General
sought disclosure of NAACP's membership list during an injunction
hearing to stop the NAACP from conducting activities within the state.3 8
The NAACP refused to comply with the court's production order and
was found in contempt.3 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed. 40
The Court reasoned "that compelled disclosure of affiliation with
groups engaged in advocacy" would "constitute [an] effective restraint
on freedom of association. '" 4 1 The Court concluded that Alabama was
unable to justify "the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right
to associate which disclosure of membership lists [was] likely to have." 4 2
Five years later, in NAACP v. Button,43 the Court again emphasized
that the first and fourteenth amendments protect freedom of expression
and association. 44 Button involved a Virginia statute which prohibited
"the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business."' 45 Spe-
cifically, the statute made it unlawful for "an agent for an individual or
organization [to] retain[] a lawyer in connection with an action to which
it [was] not a party and in which it ha[d] no pecuniary right or
liability."46
35. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (Consti-
tution guarantees freedom of association for purpose of engaging in first
amendment activities); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (first and
fourteenth amendments protect expression and association); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (affirming right "to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas").
36. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
37. Id. at 460.
38. Id. at 452-53. The state alleged that "all such documents were neces-
sary for adequate preparation for the hearing." Id. at 453.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 467.
41. Id. at 462. Thus, the Court "recognized the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." Id.
42. Id. at 466.
43. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
44. Id. at 428-29.
45. Id. at 419.
46. Id. at 423 (citation omitted).
712 [Vol. 35: p. 705
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The activities of the NAACP, an organization whose purpose is the
elimination of all racial barriers, focused on assisting litigation which
promoted this goal.4 7 NAACP lawyers were also involved in advising
individuals of their legal rights and referring them to attorneys to assist
with civil rights litigation. 48 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that NAACP activities were included within the statutory ban on
solicitation. 4 9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the activities
of the NAACP were "modes of expression and association protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.",5 0
In light of the NAACP's objective of social change, the Court rea-
soned that the means it chose to foster that goal-the process of litiga-
tion-was "a form of political expression." 5 1 Since the statute's thrust
was at "curtailing group activity leading to litigation," the statute in-
fringed first amendment freedoms. 52 The Court concluded that the
state's interest in regulating professional conduct was not substantial
and could not "justify the broad prohibition which it ha[d] imposed."15 3
In 1984, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,54 the Court refined the
concept of freedom of association and distinguished between "freedom
of intimate association" 5 5 and "freedom of expressive association." 56
In Roberts, the Supreme Court considered whether the associational
rights of the Jaycees, an all male group, were unconstitutionally in-
fringed upon by a Minnesota statute which prohibited discrimination
based upon sex.5 7 Although the Court recognized that the statute af-
fected the members' freedom of expressive association, 58 the Court also
noted that "[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is not ...
absolute."' 59 The Court explained that "[i]nfringements on that right
may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state inter-
47. Id. at 419-20. The NAACP ordinarily assisted in criminal actions in
which there was a question of possible racial discrimination as well as suits seek-
ing fully desegregated public school facilities when the litigant retained an
NAACP staff lawyer to represent them. Id. at 420.
48. Id. at 420-22.
49. Id. at 423-26.
50. Id. at 428-29.
51. Id. at 429.
52. Id. at 435-37.
53. Id. at 438-39, 444.
54. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
55. Id. at 617-18. The Court defined "freedom of intimate association," as
involving one's "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human rela-
tionships." Id.
56. Id. at 618. "[F]reedom of expressive association" is "a right to associ-
ate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amend-
ment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise
of religion." Id.
57. Id. at 612-15.
58. Id. at 621-22.
59. Id. at 623.
1990] 713
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ests... that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restric-
tive of associational freedoms." 60 The Court concluded that Minnesota
had a "compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its fe-
male citizens [which] justiflied] the impact ... of the statute . . . on the
male members' associational freedoms."' 6 1 The Court's holding was
based on its conclusion that the state had used "the least restrictive
means of achieving its ends."162
C. Civil RICO and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the relationship between
civil RICO and social activism. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,63
however, it confronted the analogous issue of the preservation of first
amendment rights in the context of a conspiracy conviction. In Clai-
borne, a large group of black citizens in Claiborne County boycotted
white merchants. 64 The boycott consisted mainly of non-violent picket-
ing, but sporadic acts and threats of violence did occur.6 5 The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that the entire boycott was unlawful and
affirmed the petitioners' liability for all damages resulting from the boy-
cott.66 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi high
court's decision. 67 The Supreme Court acknowledged that those indi-
vidual petitioners who participated in violent acts should be held liable
for their deeds, but rejected the theory of guilt by association. 68 The
Court stated:
Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual
belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts
of violence. For liability to be imposed by reason of association
alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 626. Further, the Court concluded that "the Jaycees ha[d] failed
to demonstrate ... any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of ex-
pressive association." Id.
63. 458 U.S. 886, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 898 (1982).
64. Id. at 888. In March 1966, black citizens of Claiborne County
presented white governmental officials with a list of specific demands for racial
equality and integration. Id. at 889. After the demands were rejected, the black
citizens decided to boycott the white merchants. Id.
65. Id. at 903-06. The unlawful activity included: two incidents of shots
being fired at a house, a car windshield being broken and a flower garden being
damaged. Id. at 904.
66. Id. at 888. The Mississippi Supreme Court decided that the entire boy-
cott was unlawful based on evidence that some black individuals were forced to
withhold their patronage from white merchants because of fear of reprisals. Id.
67. Id. at 934. The Supreme Court described the boycott as encompassing
"elements of criminality and elements of majesty." Id. at 888.
68. Id. at 918-19. The Court stated: "The First Amendment . . . restricts
the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his
association with another." Id.
714 [Vol. 35: p. 705
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/8
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to
further those illegal aims. 69
Although the Court approved the punishing of individuals for their un-
lawful acts, it unequivocally asserted that first amendment protections
must be safeguarded. 70 Claiborne, along with Patterson, Button and Rob-
erts, provided the relevant backdrop of constitutional issues against
which McMonagle was decided.
III. NORTHEAST WOMEN'S CENTER, INC. V. MCMONAGLE
In McMonagle, evidence at trial established that twenty-six anti-abor-
tion activists (the defendants) 7 ' unlawfully entered the plaintiff-North-
east Women's Center (the Center) on four separate occasions. 7 2 In
69. Id. at 920 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted:
In litigation of this kind the stakes are high. Concerted action is a
powerful weapon....
The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the petition-
ers .... The burden of demonstrating that it colored the entire collec-
tive effort, however, is not satisfied by evidence that violence
occurred .... The burden of demonstrating that fear rather than pro-
tected conduct was the dominant force in the movement is heavy.
Id. at 932-34.
70. Id. The Court explained:
The First Amendment does not protect violence .... When such
conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity,
however, "precision of regulation" is demanded. Specifically, the pres-
ence of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints
on the grounds that may give rise to damages liability and on the per-
sons who may be held accountable for those damages.
Id. at 916-17 (citation and footnote omitted).
71. The defendants were anti-abortion activists who had participated in var-
ious protest activities both inside and outside the Northeast Women's Center.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345. Initially, there were 42 persons sued. Id. n.2. The
plaintiff, however, dismissed its claims against 11 defendants. Id. Further, the
court directed a verdict for four defendants. Id. Although the jury found 27
defendants liable, the court granted a judgment n.o.v. for one defendant, leav-
ing 26 defendants on appeal. Id.
72. Id. at 1345. The Northeast Women's Center is a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion which provides pregnancy testing, abortions and other gynecological serv-
ices. Id. On December 8, 1984, 50 protestors, including 12 of the defendants,
rushed into the Center, knocked down employees and threw medical supplies on
the floor. Id. Based on this incident, the then acting administrator of the Center
hired security guards to protect the safety of the Center's employees and pa-
tients. Id.
On August 10, 1985, 12 defendants forced their way into the Center's
premises. Id. at 1346. One employee was injured. Id. Another employee testi-
fied that after the protestors locked themselves in an operating room, she ob-
served that machinery had been disassembled and damaged. Id.
On October 19, 1985, 24 of the defendants and others were arrested when
they attempted to again enter the Center. Id. On May 23, 1986, a fourth tres-
pass occurred. Id. This incident was the subject of the subsequent federal suit.
Id.
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August 1985, the Center filed a civil suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 7" The Center alleged
"that [the] Defendants had agreed among themselves and others to dis-
rupt the Center's business and injure its property by ... harassing the
Center's clients and employees, unlawfully entering on its property, and
destroying and damaging medical equipment." 74 Using violation of the
Hobbs Act as a predicate offense, the Center sought damages and relief
under RICO, in addition to claims under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 75
the Clayton Act 76 and the common law torts of trespass and intentional
interference with contractual relations. 77 The defendants' motion to
dismiss was denied. 7 8
The Center then sought preliminary injunctive relief which was also
denied. 79 This denial was vacated, however, by the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit which remanded with the suggestion that the parties
agree to convert the action into a final injunction hearing.8 0 The parties
73. Id. at 1347.
74. Id.
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). This claim resulted in a directed verdict for
the defendants. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347. For a discussion of this outcome,
see infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
77. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347.
78. Id. The defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and that the court should not
hear the plaintiff's pendent state law claims in view of the absence of any valid
federal claims. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 624 F. Supp.
736, 737 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Judge Kelly looked at the complaint in the light most favorable to the
pleader. Id. He concluded that the set of facts pled could possibly result in
liability for the defendants under both RICO and federal anti-trust laws and
should not be dismissed. Id. at 738, 741. Since the complaint sufficiently al-
leged two federal claims, the defendants' request to dismiss the plaintiff's state
law claim for lack of a surviving federal claim was also dismissed. Id. at 741.
79. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347. The Center contended that the defend-
ants had intensified their harassment of patients and staff, that they were acting
to prevent the Center from moving to its new location and that since the com-
plaint had been filed, the defendants had forcibly entered the Center on two
occasions. Id.
80. Id. The district court had held a hearing in which it heard testimony
and viewed videotapes of the protests. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle, 813 F.2d 53, 54 (3d Cir. 1987). The appellate court noted that
although the district court determined that the Center had failed to demonstrate
irreparable harm as a consequence of the defendants' activities, it had made no
such factual findings in its opinion or its order. Id. Furthermore, the court as-
serted that the district court had not evaluated the testimony. Id. The court
found this "contrary to the mandate of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 52(a)
which requires, inter alia, that in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions,
the court 'shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds for its action.' " Id. The absence of factual find-
ings made it impossible for the appellate court to discharge its appellate func-
tion under the required clearly erroneous standard. Id.
716 [Vol. 35: p. 705
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complied and the final injunction hearing was consolidated with the trial
on the merits. 8 1 At trial, the Center presented to the jury the testimony
of ten witnesses and two hours of video tape.82 When the Center rested,
the defendants moved for directed verdicts.
83
Due to the complexity of the issues and the "disjointed presentation
of the evidence," the court decided to hold "an extended hearing on the
defendants' motions.' 184 The court directed a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants on the action brought under the Sherman Act because the
Center failed to state a prima facie claim. 85 The court stated that since
the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden of proof, it need not decide
whether the first amendment would have denied the Center recovery
had the burden been met.86
Turning to the alleged RICO violation, the court noted that recov-
ery under RICO was being sought under sections 1962(c) and (d).8 7
Thus, the plaintiff was required to "establish the existence of an 'enter-
prise' [and] 'a pattern of racketeering activity' composed of the commis-
sion of at least two predicate acts ... within a ten-year period."'8 8 The
Center alleged both robbery and Hobbs Act extortion as the predicate
acts. 89 The Center argued that it had proven robbery by showing that
on August 10, 1985, a number of defendants, "through the use of physi-
cal force, [had] removed property from [the Center's] offices." 90 The
Center's extortion claims rested on its "characteriz[ation of] the defend-
The court, in an opinion handed down March 11, 1987, expressed concern
over the fact that the action had been commenced on August 1, 1985, but had
not yet reached the final hearing stage. Id. at 53-54. Therefore, it recom-
mended converting the action into a final injunction hearing. Id. at 54-55. The
availability of injunctive relief would then depend on the Center's success on the
merits of the case rather than on "the difficult factual issue of whether [the
Center would] suffer irreparable harm pending final adjudication." Id. at 55.
81. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147,
1151 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), reh'g
denied, No. 88-1333, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
82. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300,
1303 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1305. The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to state a
prima facie claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1. According to the court, in order to prove
an anti-trust violation, the plaintiff had to demonstrate an actual anti-competi-
tive impact on the provision of abortion services within the relevant product and
geographic market. Id. at 1304-05. The Center, however, had not introduced
such evidence. Id. at 1305.
86. Id. at 1305-06. The court stated that "[tihe First Amendment does limit
the application of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1306 n.8 (citing Eastern R.R. Presi-
dent's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)).
87. Id. at 1306 n.9. For the text of section 1962, see supra note 3.
88. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. at 1306 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 1306-07.
90. Id.
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ants' protest activities as violative of the Hobbs Act." 9 1
The court began its analysis of the Center's Hobbs Act claims by
stating that "in assessing the applicability of the Hobbs Act to the de-
fendants' conduct, the precepts of the Constitution must be kept in
mind." 92 Acknowledging that "[a]ttempts to persuade another to action
are clearly within the scope of the First Amendment," the court began
its analysis of the specific details of the defendants' activities.9 3 The
court found that the purpose behind the defendants' speech-"to per-
suade patients to forego their abortions or employees to leave their em-
ployment"-did not "diminish its protection under the Constitution."'94
Further, peaceful picketing and leafletting were also protected "pro-
vided that the manner of expression retained its peaceful nature."'9 5
The court stated, however, that "[t]he First Amendment will not . . .
offer a sanctuary for violence."'9 6 The court underscored that the
Center had the burden of proof regarding such unlawful conduct in or-
der to establish extortionate behavior. 97 The Center "must prove more
than the offensive or coercive nature of a defendant's protest activities
[and] more than a defendant's intent that the Center cease providing
abortions, that its employees resign their abortion-related posts, or that
its patients cancel their appointments.1
9 8
91. Id. at 1307. The court explained that a Hobbs Act violation occurs if a
person "induces his victim to part with property through the use of fear [which]
adversely affects interstate commerce." Id. (citation omitted). According to the
court, the Hobbs Act also applies "to attempted extortions and conspiracies to
commit extortion." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982)). Additionally, under
the Hobbs Act "property" includes intangible property interests, for example,
"the right to make business decisions free from wrongfully imposed outside
pressures." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Center argued:
[Tihe defendants, through the use of fear instilled by their protest ac-
tivities, attempted and conspired to induce (1) the Center, (2) its em-
ployees, and (3) its patients to part with intangible property interests.
Specifically, the defendants allegedly attempted and conspired to extort
from the Center its property interest in continuing to provide abortion
services, from the employees their property interest in continuing their
employment at the Center, and from the patients their property inter-
est in entering into a contractual relationship with the Center.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The defendants, in their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, ar-
gued that the McMonagle court's use of the language "to part with property,"
rather than to "obtain property," in the definition of extortion, was "an unwar-
ranted and unprecedented expansion of the scope of the Hobbs Act." Petition,
supra note 16, at 25.
92. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. at 1307.
93. Id. at 1308 (citation omitted).
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911, reh'g
denied, 459 U.S. 898 (1982)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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The court concluded that the Center had presented evidence suffi-
cient to establish four predicate acts: "the August 10 robbery, the extor-
tion of the Center, the extortion of its employees, and the extortion of
its patients." 9 9 Further, the court concluded that the "enterprise" ele-
ment had been established.' 0 0 Since the "enterprise" and "pattern of
racketeering activity" elements had been established, the RICO claim
under section 1962(c) was allowed to go to the jury.
The court then began its examination of the Center's RICO claim
under section 1962(d) which makes it "unlawful for any person to con-
spire to violate section 1962(c) [of RICO]."' 0 ' The court acknowledged
two legal concerns regarding this claim.' 0 2 First, section 1962(d) ap-
plied only to those defendants who "conspired intentionally, not just to
trespass inside the Center's offices, but also to commit two acts of rob-
bery or extortion."' 0 3 Second, the free assembly clause placed a heavy
burden on the Center's conspiracy theory. 104 The court stated that "lia-
bility imposed for one's involvement with others-'guilt for associa-
tion'-conflicts sharply with the precepts of the First Amendment."' 0 5
Thus, the court concluded that the Center "bears the burden of proving
that each defendant ... specifically intended to accomplish those illegal
aims," 10 6 Therefore, the court found that "[t]he only defendants the
jury could possibly find liable under this section are those ... who actu-
ally entered the Center" and two defendants who actively participated in
preventing persons from gaining access to the Center.' 0 7 The court di-
rected a verdict for four other defendants who did not meet the criteria
for liability under this section 1962(c) claim.' 0 8
Upon completion of the hearing on the defendants' motions for di-
99. Id. at 1309. The Center also argued that a claim for extortion had been
established with respect to those defendants who had protested at the homes of
Center employees. Id. at 1308-09 n. 12. The court rejected this claim, however,
stating that "because there were no time, place, and manner limitations on the
defendants and because the plaintiff has introduced no evidence that the picket-
ing was otherwise unlawful, this picketing cannot, consistent with the First
Amendment, constitute evidence of extortion." Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 1308-09.
101. Id. at 1310 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,925, reh'g
denied, 459 U.S. 898 (1982)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1309 nn.13 & 14, 1310. The court allowed section 1962(d)
claims against two defendants who were never placed inside the Center, but who
allegedly were involved in either "blockad[ing]" the Center's front door or "bar-
ricad[ing]" the only entrance to the Center's parking lot. Id. The court viewed
this conduct as sufficient evidence to establish the Center's extortion theory. Id.
at 1309-10 & n. 13. For a discussion of the Center's extortion theory, see supra
note 91.
108. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. at 1310.
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rected verdicts, the remaining RICO, trespass and intentional interfer-
ence with contract claims were sent to the jury.10 9 The jury found
twenty-seven defendants liable under RICO. 1 0 Both the Center and
the defendants appealed.111
Judge Sloviter, writing on behalf of a unanimous Third Circuit
panel, began her review by addressing the general issue of the applica-
bility of civil RICO to the instant case. 112 Relying on Sedima S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 1 3 as well as Third Circuit precedent in Gilbert v. Prudential-
Bache Security Inc. ,114 the court emphasized that the Supreme Court has
signaled that civil RICO should be read broadly; it is available to all
109. Id. at 1313.
110. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347. The damages on the RICO claim were
assessed at $887.28, which reflected the cost of repairing certain medical equip-
ment. Id. Pursuant to section 1964(c) of RICO, the district court trebled these
damages. Id.
The jury also found that three defendants had interfered with the Center's
contracts with its employees but awarded no damages because there was no find-
ing of proximate loss. Id. The jury found 24 defendants liable for trespass and
awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Id. Compensatory damages were
assessed at $42,087.95, while punitive damages were assessed at $2,000 per de-
fendant for a total of $48,000. Id.
Defendants' motions for a new trial and judgment n.o.v. were denied. Id.
The court, however, did grant judgment n.o.v. on the punitive damages award.
Id. It reasoned "that the Center had substantially prejudiced [the) Defendants
by failing to request punitive damages in a timely and consistent manner." Id.
The court concluded that this had "successfully preclud[ed the] Defendants
from presenting evidence of motive that would have been relevant on the puni-
tive damages issue." Id.
Additionally, the court declined to give the Center any injunctive relief on
its successful RICO and interference with contract claims, relying on the unclean
hands doctrine. Id. Evidence had been offered showing that a Center physician
had failed to comply with a fetal tissue inspection provision of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(c) (Purdon
1983)).
The court did, however, grant injunctive relief on the trespass claim. Id.
The defendants were enjoined "from entering the Center's premises, entering
the parking lot adjacent to the Center for the purpose of protesting there, block-
ing or attempting to block the entrances to the Center or parking lot" and from
restricting the ingress and egress to or from the Center or parking lot. Id. at
1347-48.
111. Id. at 1348. The Center challenged the district court's use of the un-
clean hands doctrine to limit the injunctive relief as well as the court's order
setting aside the jury's punitive damage award. Id. at 1345. For a discussion of
these challenges, see infra note 137.
The defendants "raise[d] more than twenty issues on their cross-appeals,
including the applica[bility] of civil RICO, the availability of the justification de-
fense, and various claims of prejudicial error at trial." McMonagle, 868 F.2d at
1345. For a discussion of the challenges addressing civil RICO, see infra notes
112-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the challenges addressing
the justification defense, see infra note 137.
112. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345, 1348.
113. For a discussion of Sedima, see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying
text.
114. 769 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1985). In this securities fraud action, the Third
16
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private plaintiffs who are able to allege and prove the elements under
the statute's provisions." 5 The Third Circuit pointed out that the
Center had pled, and the jury had found, "a RICO violation based on a
pattern of extortionate acts.' 16 The court found this pattern sufficient
to invoke the civil provisions of RICO."17
After finding that the requirements for a civil RICO action had been
met, the court then examined the defendants' argument that civil RICO
should not be applicable upon these particular facts because the defend-
ants' actions were motivated by their political beliefs." 18 Analyzing this
proposition, the court referred to its own decision in United States v. Dick-
ens. 1 19 Dickens involved the conviction of seventeen Black Muslim de-
fendants who committed numerous robberies in violation of RICO to
finance their religious organization. 120 Quoting the Dickens court, the
Third Circuit asserted that "[t]he First Amendment ... does not shield
from governmental scrutiny practices which imperil public safety, peace
or order."' 1 2
1
After rejecting the idea of RICO immunity based on political moti-
vation, 12 2 the McMonagle court next discussed the defendants' conten-
tion that the Center had failed to show that it suffered a RICO injury. 12 3
The court conceptualized this argument as encompassing two related
issues: (1) whether a separate and distinct racketeering injury was re-
Circuit relied upon Sedima and refused to require that the plaintiff "allege a
nexus between the defendants and organized crime." Id. at 942.
115. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348. For a discussion of the requirements of
a civil RICO action, see supra notes 3 & 5.
116. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348.
117. Id. For a discussion of the civil provisions of RICO, see supra notes 3
& 5.
118. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49. For a discussion of whether the
court misconstrued the defendants' argument, see infra note 122.
119. 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983).
120. Id. at 769.
121. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348 (quoting United States v. Dickens, 695
F.2d 765, 772 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983)). Upon analysis
of the McMonagle court's reasoning regarding the defendants' argument of im-
munity based upon political motivation, it is apparent that the court found the
first amendment irrelevant to these facts due to the presence of unlawful activity.
The court pointed out that the presence of unlawful activity distinguished the
instant case from a situation where protected first amendment activities are at issue.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49. For a discussion of the opposing point of view,
i.e., that the first amendment was implicated on these facts, see infra notes 138-
49 and accompanying text.
122. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49. In their petition for a writ of certio-
rari, the protestors argued that the Third Circuit misconstrued their challenge.
Petition, supra note 16, at 22. Petitioners argued that they were not claiming any
special immunity, but rather, since they had not appropriated any economic ben-
efit unto themselves, civil RICO was inapplicable. Id. For a discussion of the
issue of whether a civil RICO enterprise or racketeering activity requires a pecu-
niary motive, see supra note 16.
123. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349.
17
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quired, and (2) whether the Hobbs Act covers extortion of intangible
rights. Relying on Sedima, in addition to its own precedent in Malley-Duff
& Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co. 124 and Zap v. Frankel,12 5 the Third
Circuit rejected the notion of conditioning liability upon a showing of
distinct racketeering injury. 12 6 The court concluded that the RICO in-
jury requirement was sufficiently met by the tangible injury to the
Center's medical equipment. 12 7
Next, the court scrutinized the second part of the defendants' RICO
injury challenge, examining whether economic motivation is a necessary
element of the crime of extortion under the Hobbs Act.12 8 The defend-
ants argued that the use of the Hobbs Act to provide the predicate acts
in the instant case was inappropriate because the element of economic
motivation was absent. 129 The Third Circuit summarily dismissed this
argument, asserting that such a contention ignored "well-established
precedent" which held that "lack of [an] economic motive does not con-
stitute a defense to Hobbs Act crimes." 13 0
124. 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), af'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
The McMonagle court cited Malley-Duff for the proposition that "delay, added
expenses and inconvenience caused by defendants' interference with a lawsuit
[were] sufficient to meet [the RICO] injury requirement." McMonagle, 868 F.2d
at 1349 (quoting Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341,
355 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 143 (1987)).
125. 770 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1985). The McMonagle court cited Zap for the
proposition that a "RICO plaintiff need allege 'no independent "racketeering
injury" apart from injury caused by predicate acts.' " McMonagle, 868 F.2d at
1349 (quoting Zap v. Frankel, 770 F.2d 24, 26 (3d Cir. 1985)).
126. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349. For a discussion of the requirement of a
distinct and separate "racketeering injury," see supra note 30. In Sedima, the
Supreme Court had rejected the notion that it was necessary for the plaintiff to
show that it suffered "a competitive injury." McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349 (citing
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985)). For a discussion
of Sedima, see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
127. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349.
128. Id. at 1349-50.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1350. The "well-established precedent" to which the court re-
ferred included: United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 1983)
(upholding Hobbs Act conviction of anti-abortion protestors who abducted and
threatened doctor in attempt to induce him to cease performing abortions);
United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1979) (extorted payments
went to political party's coffers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States
v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1975) (no exception to Hobbs Act when
extorsive solicitations made for religious purpose).
The court misapplied these cases because each of these cases are examples
of economic motivation, not the lack thereof. Cerilli involved the extortion con-
viction of state officials who required political contributions as a condition for a
lessor's equipment being used on state jobs. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 418. Starks in-
volved the extortion of money from a tavern owner for religious purposes.
Starks, 515 F.2d at 115. Although the defendants in Cerilli and Starks did not
personally benefit from their extortion, they were economically motivated on
behalf of a third party.
Anderson involved the Hobbs Act conviction of anti-abortion activists who
18
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The defendants also maintained that economic injury is an essential
element of extortion when it is used as a predicate offense under
RICO.13 ' The defendants reasoned that the claimed extortion of the
Center's intangible right to continue to operate its business was inade-
quate to state a cause of action as a RICO predicate offense.' 3 2 The
court rejected this theory13 3 pointing out that in United States v. Local 560
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ' 3 4 the Third Circuit had consid-
ered the same issue and had extended the Hobbs Act to protect intangi-
ble as well as tangible property.' 3 5 The McMonagle court asserted that
"[r]ights involving the conduct of business are property rights" and
therefore were the proper subject of an extortion action.' 3 6 The Third
Circuit thus concluded that the defendants' challenges of the RICO con-
victions were all without merit and upheld the jury's findings.13 7
kidnapped and threatened a doctor in an attempt to convince him to cease per-
forming abortions. Anderson, 716 F.2d at 447. In the course of this attempt,
however, the defendants obtained three hundred dollars from the doctor. Id.
Therefore, Cerilli, Starks and Anderson do not support the Third Circuit's conclu-
sion that economic motivation is not a necessary element of Hobbs Act extor-
tion. See Petition, supra note 16, at 27.
131. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
132. Id. "The Center's extortion claim was that Defendants used force,
threats of force, fear and violence in [an attempt] to force the Center out of
business." Id. The district court instructed the jury:
Specifically, defendants are charged with attempting and conspiring to
extort from the Center its property interest in continuing to provide
abortion services, from its employees, their property interest in contin-
uing their employment with the Center, and from patients, their prop-
erty interest in entering into a contractual relationship with the Center.
Id. (citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
135. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350 (citing United States v. Local 560 of the
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1140 (1986)). In Local 560, the intangible property rights included the union
membership's rights to vote, speak and assemble. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 271.
136. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
137. Id. The Third Circuit then addressed the defendants' argument that
the justification defense should have been available to them. Id. at 1350-52.
The court began by rejecting the general defense of good faith motive. Id. at
1350-51. Acknowledging that the justification defense was available in Penn-
sylvania, the court discussed Commonwealth v. Capitolo. Id. at 1351 (citing 508 Pa.
372, 498 A.2d 806 (1985)). In Capitolo, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court posited
a four-part test to determine the availability of such a defense. Id. (citing Com-
monwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 378, 498 A.2d 806, 809 (1985)). The Third
Circuit stated:
[T]he justification defense rests on a defendant's ability to show:
"(1) that the actor was faced with clear and imminent harm... ; (2) that
the actor could reasonably expect that [his/her] actions would be effec-
tive in avoiding this greater harm; (3) that there [was] no legal alterna-
tive [that would have been] effective in abating the harm; and (4) that
the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and
deliberate choice regarding the values at issue."
7231990]
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit's decision in McMonagle demonstrated the court's
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 378, 498 A.2d 806, 809
(1985)).
The Third Circuit stated that this four-part test had been applied in Com-
monwealth v. Wall in which the defendants were convicted of criminal trespass
during an abortion protest. Id. at 1351-52 (citing 372 Pa. Super. 534, 539 A.2d
1325 (1988)). The Third Circuit explained that the defense was precluded in
Wall because none of the Capitolo requirements were met. Id. at 1352 (citing
Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa. Super. 534, 543, 539 A.2d 1325, 1328-29
(1988)). The Third Circuit found the same analysis applicable in the instant
case. Id. The court concluded that the justification defense was not available to
the defendants because the defendants had "numerous legal alternatives ... to
pursue their goal of persuading women not to have abortions. For example,
they could continue to march, go door-to-door to proselytize their views, dis-
tribute literature, personally or through the mails, and contact residents by tele-
phone, short of harassment." Id.
After rejecting the availability of the justification defense in the case at
hand, the court then reviewed the plaintiff's challenge of the district court's de-
nial of injunctive relief under the unclean hands doctrine. Id. at 1353-56. Judge
Sloviter began her review by noting that the unclean hands doctrine is only ap-
propriate when applied to matters immediately impacting upon the lawsuit. Id.
at 1354-55. The district court found the plaintiffs guilty of unclean hands due to
a violation of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act relating to the examination
of fetal tissue by one of the physicians practicing at the Center. Id. at 1353-54.
Judge Sloviter reasoned that even if such a violation had occurred, it was "at
most collateral to the matter involved in this lawsuit," because it had "no con-
nection at all to the Defendants' actions which the jury found violated both fed-
eral and state law." Id. at 1354. Thus, the court concluded that the district
court had erred in applying the unclean hands doctrine in this situation. Id. at
1355. Because all of the injunctive relief sought could be granted under the
state law claim of interference with contractual relationships, the court declined
to reach the defendants' alternative argument that injunctive relief is not avail-
able to private parties under RICO's civil provisions. Id. Although the defend-
ants argued that such injunctive relief must be limited to the three defendants
found liable under the interference with contractual relationship claim, the court
rejected this argument. Id. at 1355-56. Relying on Pennsylvania case law and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), the court reasoned that since the defend-
ants were part of an enterprise, such evidence of concerted conduct would allow
the injunction to be entered against all of the defendants. Id.
The Center argued that the district court had not granted it effective relief.
Id. at 1356. For a discussion of the relief granted, see supra note 110.
Therefore, the Center argued that the Third Circuit should enter its pro-
posed injunction, or alternatively, direct the district court to do so in clear
terms. Id. at 1356. The Third Circuit concluded, however, that "the district
court [was] in [a] better position . . . to set the terms of an appropriate injunc-
tion." Id. Thus, the court remanded the matter of adequacy of the injunction to
the district court. Id. The district court's final decision regarding the terms of
the injunction was not reached until August 27, 1990. See Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, No. 85-4845 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1990) (1990 WL
126529).
Lastly, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of punitive
damages. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1356-57. Using the abuse of discretion stan-
dard of review, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court had not erred
in entering the judgment n.o.v. on the issue of punitive damages. Id. It rea-
soned that the defendants were prejudiced because they were not put on notice
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reluctance to fully explore the first amendment implications of the appli-
cation of civil RICO to the facts before it. Rather, the Third Circuit
rejected first amendment immunity for civil protestors without fully dis-
cussing the constitutional implications of its actions.' 3 8 Asserting that
the first amendment was not a sanctuary for illegal activities, the court
concluded that the first amendment was not implicated on these facts
because of the presence of illegal activity. The Third Circuit's reasoning
that the presence of unlawful activity renders a first amendment inquiry
unnecessary is unsound because it omits any analysis of impermissible
guilt by association, an analysis which is necessitated by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 139
Claiborne stands for the proposition that a careful first amendment
analysis is indicated whenever liability is imposed for a combination of
lawful and unlawful social protest activity. 140 Claiborne restricts the gov-
ernment from imposing liability on an individual for conspiracy solely
because the individual associates with another who participates in un-
lawful acts.'41 Instead, the Claiborne doctrine mandates that liability can
only be imposed after establishing that "the group itself possessed un-
lawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those
illegal aims."' 4 2
that punitive damages were at issue in the trial. Id. at 1356. As evidence of the
defendants' lack of notice, the court cited three examples: (1) the Center failed
to mention punitive damages in its pretrial memorandum as was required by
local rule; (2) it failed to object to the court's pretrial order specifying the ele-
ments of damages, which excluded punitive damages; and (3) the court's preclu-
sion of evidence on motive in response to the Center's motion in limine. The
Third Circuit concluded that it was within the district court's discretion to rule
that the Center should not have been granted a jury charge on punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 1356-57.
138. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49. For a discussion of the court's rejec-
tion of immunity based on political motivation, see supra notes 118-22 and ac-
companying text.
139. 458 U.S. 886, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 898 (1982). After the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in McMonagle, the defendants petitioned for a rehearing in banc,
arguing that the court should have applied Claiborne to the facts before it. Peti-
tioners' Reply Brief in Support of Petition and Appendix at 3, McMonagle v.
Northeast Women's Center, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989) (No. 88-2137). This
argument was rejected by the Third Circuit in an unreported decision. Id. For a
discussion of the Claiborne decision, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying
text.
140. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 916. The Court stated: "When [unlawful con-
duct] occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity. . . 'precision of
regulation' is demanded." Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 908. The court noted that "[tihe right to associate does not lose
all constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may
have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected."
Id.
142. Id. at 920 (footnote omitted). In addition to placing severe restraints
on the imposition of liability, the Claiborne Court also established guidelines for
the imposition of damages. Id. at 916-20. Only damages which are proximately
1990]
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The Claiborne Court presented an available framework for review;
the Court explained:
A massive and prolonged [social and political change] effort...
cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by refer-
ence to the ephemeral consequences of a relatively few violent
acts. Such a characterization must be supported by findings
that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding
that specific parties agreed to use unlawful means, that care-
fully identify the impact of such unlawful conduct, and that rec-
ognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of
punishment for constitutionally protected activity. 143
Applying the Claiborne framework, the Third Circuit might have analyzed
the jury's verdict to insure a finding that each defendant possessed the nec-
essary specific intent to further the RICO predicate acts of extortion and
robbery, not simply trespass. 144 Such a review would have comported
with Claiborne, while providing a conceptual framework for district court
judges, faced in the future with similar civil RICO claims against protes-
tors, to fully and fairly apply the law while avoiding an impermissible
infringement of first amendment rights.
In addition to a Claiborne analysis to determine who can be held lia-
ble for unlawful acts committed by a few individuals in the context of
group protest activities, the first amendment also requires a less restric-
tive means analysis to determine the appropriateness of the means em-
ployed to hold such individuals liable. 14 5 In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, the Court explained that "[t]he right to associate for expressive
purposes is not ... absolute. Infringements on that right may be justi-
fied by . . .compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas . . .that cannot be achieved through means significantly less re-
strictive of associational freedoms."' 46
caused by the unlawful conduct, not those which result from the lawful activity,
can be awarded. Id. at 920-21.
143. Id. at 933-34.
144. Although the Third Circuit did not conduct a Claiborne analysis, the
district court was aware of the first amendment implications of the fact situation
which had been presented to it. For a discussion of the district court's analysis
of the first amendment implications of McMonagle, see supra notes 86, 92-98 and
accompanying text.
Given the district court's acknowledgment of the first amendment implica-
tions of the case and the district court's concern over the "disjointed presenta-
tion of the evidence," the Third Circuit should have conducted a Claiborne
inquiry. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. at 1303. An evaluation of the "detailed series
of interrogatories prepared by the district court" for the jury should have been
performed to insure the sufficiency of the findings. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at
1347.
145. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984). For
a discussion of Roberts, see supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
146. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
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In McMonagle, the government's interest in the elimination of or-
ganized crime, law enforcement and public safety were compelling gov-
ernment interests. But, the interest in the elimination of organized
crime does not appear to be furthered by the application of civil RICO
to social protestors. Also, the interests in law enforcement and public
safety could be advanced through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms than the imposition of civil RICO treble damages
because the Center had ample state law remedies.' 4 7 The McMonagle
defendants conceded that the Center was entitled "to recover damages
for nuisance, civil trespass, or destruction of property to the extent [the
damages were] proven and flow[ed] directly from any activities . . . not
protected by the First Amendment."' 4 8 Therefore, the imposition of
civil RICO penalties on the McMonagle protestors may have constituted
an impermissible infringement of first amendment rights. The imposi-
tion of treble damages, the possibility of stigmatization as a racketeer, if
convicted, and the potential for a finding of "guilt by association" may
serve to chill the exercise of first amendment freedoms in the future.
This proposition finds support in the Supreme Court's reasoning in
NAACP v. Button, where the Court stated that "[t]he threat of sanctions
may deter [the exercise of first amendment freedoms] almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions." 1 49
McMonagle raises the specter of first amendment freedoms effec-
tively chilled by the application of civil RICO to social protestors. 150
Moreover, the right to civil protest has historically been at the core of
our democratic society:' 5 1
Violation of the law for the purpose of protest in this country is
a practice which stretches back through the sit-ins of the Civil
Rights movement, the labor strikes, Thoreau, and the Boston
Tea Party, to the early eighteenth century when a group of
Quaker citizens in Pennsylvania refused to pay taxes to support
[the] war against the Indians. 152
147. See Petition, supra note 16, at 17; see also Note, Limiting Political Expres-
sion by Expanding Racketeering Laws: The Danger of Applying a Commercial Statute in the
Political Realm, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 201, 224 (1988) (arguing protestors should be
liable only under state law).
148. Petition, supra note 16, at 17.
149. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). For a discussion of But-
ton, see supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
150. See Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are Racke-
teers?, 56 UMKC L. REV. 287, 309 n.153 (1988) (suggesting that animal rights,
anti-nuclear and anti-apartheid activists may now fall under RICO); Note, supra
note 147, at 203, 216 (broad interpretation of RICO threatens constitutional
rights).
151. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 913. "This Court has recognized that expres-
sion on public issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values.'" Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980)).
152. Recent Development, Civil Disobedience - Protests Beyond the Law, 14 ST.
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Regular utilization of the RICO statute in the area of social protest may
serve as a disincentive for individuals who might otherwise join activist
causes.15 3 Similarly, the fear of exposing themselves to a RICO prose-
cution may dissuade citizens from advocating beliefs that they have a
right to encourage.15 4
Civil rights advocates and Vietnam War protestors are just two ex-
amples of civil protest groups which impacted upon the policies and law
of this nation. If civil RICO had been available in the sixties, it is possi-
ble that the social forces brought to bear by these and other groups may
have been weakened or snuffed out at their inception. Although the
squelching of efforts directed at social change may not have been the
intent of the Third Circuit, it may nevertheless be the effect of the
court's opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to McMonagle, the majority of civil RICO actions had involved
a commercial or business setting.155 Yet, the Third Circuit affirmed the
application of civil RICO to a group of protestors who were motivated
by a desire for social change, not economic gain. This elimination of the
requirement of a pecuniary motive for a civil RICO action, 156 coupled
with the use of civil RICO in the area of civil protest, may greatly extend
the reach of civil RICO.
Equally significant is the Third Circuit's conclusion that the first
amendment was irrelevant to the facts before it because of the presence
of illegal activity. This conclusion raises the concern that civil RICO
may become a tool of oppression used to dissuade advocates of social
change and to quash unpopular viewpoints.
The McMonagle decision is important because it applied civil RICO
in an area where it had not previously been applied and, arguably, was
never meant to be applied. It is unfortunate that the court declined the
opportunity to set forth a strong constitutional standard desperately
Louis U.L.J. 719, 719 (1970). See generally Comment, Civil Disobedience and the
First Amendment, 32 UCLA L. REV. 904 (1985) (discussion of accommodation of
civil disobedience within first amendment).
153. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (dis-
closure of NAACP membership list may chill freedom of association by dissuad-
ing others from joining because of fear of consequences of disclosure). For a
discussion of Patterson, see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
154. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462-63 (disclosure of membership list likely to
adversely affect members' ability to foster and advocate beliefs).
155. For a discussion of the types of cases brought under civil RICO, see
supra note 12.
156. For a discussion of the requirement that the RICO enterprise have a
pecuniary motive, and the Third Circuit's implicit rejection of this requirement,
see supra note 16.
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needed to guide Third Circuit courts in the future, 15 7 while safeguard-
ing the first amendment right of association.
Marguerite C. Gualtieri
157. A bill presently before Congress proposes that RICO be amended so
that " 'racketeering activity' does not include any conduct consisting of nonvio-
lent protest." H.R. 3522, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). A case which includes
both nonviolent and violent protest activities, however, might still fall within the
purview of RICO. Thus, a strong judicial standard is required to ensure that
nonviolent protestors are not held liable under RICO simply because of their
association with a group of individuals, a few of whom participate in violent
activities.
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